My research lies at the intersection of pragmatist philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, with a particular emphasis on the conceptual foundations of quantum theory.
At the heart of my work is the project of recasting neo-pragmatism as irenic pragmatism: a conciliatory approach within the philosophy of language—conceived as first philosophy—that can be productively extended to more concrete philosophical contexts, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I characterize neo-pragmatism not as a global anti-representationalist view, but as a global conciliatory perspective that foregrounds and theorizes from shared commitments. In contrast to Richard Rorty’s iconoclastic pragmatism, irenic pragmatism is not a radical, revisionary stance on thought and language. Rather, I present it as a ‘core’ position, in a spirit similar to Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude (1986), which identifies a shared core between realism and anti-realism and rejects further philosophical additions to this core.
In developing and advocating for irenic pragmatism, I build on the efforts of Huw Price and Robert Brandom to shift neo-pragmatism from its more radical Rortyan phase toward a more irenic approach. My research aims to complete this transition, presenting neo-pragmatism in its least iconoclastic and most ecumenical form. I argue that irenic pragmatism serves as a core position in the philosophy of language—one that both traditional representationalists and anti-representationalists can endorse, while attaching their own further, optional, and controversial commitments.
A second strand of my research applies this core pragmatist framework to the interpretation of quantum theory—an arena where debates about representation are especially contentious and in need of a conciliatory perspective. I develop and defend a position I call irenic quantum pragmatism, which offers a common-ground interpretation of quantum mechanics. Traditional representationalist and anti-representationalist approaches each add substantial ontological or semantic commitments to this view. I argue, however, that such additions are optional and contestable rather than essential, and that the irenic pragmatist core itself constitutes a stable and viable interpretation of quantum theory. This view isolates the fundamental inferential and epistemic roles that quantum theory plays, demonstrating that these are sufficient to account for scientific practice—even in the absence of consensus about what the theory says the world is like.
A third strand of my research examines the historical and intellectual roots of my pragmatist orientation by reconstructing the early American reception of quantum theory through the work of Edwin C. Kemble, widely recognized as America’s first quantum theorist. Kemble played a central role in introducing and initiating the theoretical study of quantum mechanics in the United States. In my historical research, I demonstrate Kemble’s role as a conduit for quantum theory in the American context and trace the evolution of his thinking between 1919 and 1939, identifying three distinct phases that culminate in a robust, early pragmatist interpretation of the theory.
Future Research Plans
Book Project:
Looking ahead, I intend to develop a book-length defense of irenic pragmatism and irenic quantum pragmatism, expanding the core arguments of my dissertation and further exploring their implications for philosophy and the philosophy of science.
Meta-philosophical Account:
I also plan to develop a meta-philosophical account of what it means to give and evaluate interpretations of physical theories—an account that does not presuppose representationalist commitments and that aims to clarify the implicit norms structuring interpretive debates. This project will offer a more inclusive framework for interpretation, one capable of accommodating pragmatist and anti-representationalist approaches that are often excluded by prevailing assumptions.
Epistemological Status of Interpretive Debates:
Finally, I will examine the epistemological status of longstanding interpretive debates in quantum theory, drawing on van Fraassen’s (2002) distinction between stances and doctrines to assess whether the persistence of disagreement signals a deeper philosophical impasse. Should interpretations of quantum theory be understood as stances—that is, orientation-guiding frameworks shaped by values, explanatory aims, and heuristics—or as doctrines that make truth-apt ontological claims (or denials, in the case of anti-representationalists) about the world? Is the debate over the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics truly ‘gridlocked’, as Craig Callender and others claim, or is the deadlock only apparent? Can future philosophical progress be made even in the absence of knowledge about, for example, whether Bohmian and spontaneous-collapse approaches can be successfully extended to relativistic quantum field theory (a development that might better be classified as progress in physics)? My aim is to clarify the status of interpretive commitments in quantum theory and to assess whether reframing interpretations as stances, rather than doctrines, offers a more constructive path forward.